Footnotes

Links to files at <http://samsara.law.cwru.edu/blog/> made before the redirection feature was added are also permanent.

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... codes.¹

Is that use of the word ``code'' within the multitude of meanings assigned to it by Larry Lessig?

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... Greplaw.com.²

Grep is an acronym for ``global regular expression print.''

Grep searches the named input FILEs (or standard input if no files are named, or the file name - is given) for lines containing a match to the given PATTERN. By default, grep prints the matching lines.

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... articles.³

Here is what Greplaw has to say about itself:

About Greplaw

What the hell is this crap?

Greplaw is a production of the Berkman Center for Internet & Society. The Berkman Center for Internet & Society is a research program founded to explore cyberspace, share in its study, and help pioneer its development. Greplaw's goal is to create a frequently updated, highly interactive forum for the dissemination and discussion of legal news concerning information technology. We aim to bring together the top legal minds in the field and the technology-oriented individuals and organizations whose activities are the subject of IT law.

The idea for Greplaw was born when some bright folks at the Berkman Center decided that the concept behind the popular Slashdot technology news site would also work well for legal discussion. As you may or may not have guessed, Greplaw.org runs on the opensource software called Slashcode, which also drives Slashdot.

Who are you guys, anyway?

Greplaw is run by Berkman Center students, staff, and affiliates. However, we also rely heavily on public participation in our news gathering functions. Going forward, we are very open to other kinds of participation in our project from students, lawyers, and others without connection to the Berkman Center. For a current list of our active participants, please see our Staff Page.

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... later,⁴

Greplaw shows the month, day, and time when an article was posted, but not the year, and it shows that the interview with Seth was published in some December or other.

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... me ¹

Why else would I bother to write about them?

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... WIMP ²

Windows, Icons, Menus and a Pointing device.

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... side.¹

See my earlier entry on Seth Finkelstein's Contribution.

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... Pyyluoma.²

See my earlier entry on Teemu Pyyluoma's View.

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... here.¹

But cf., the Liar's Paradox.

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... using ¹

And in some cases even referring to.

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... realization ²

What is going on when one awakes with a realization is a matter that, if not past conjecture, certainly is past any current scientific understanding.

Imagine now that some cognitive scientist discovers a way to induce the process of waking with a realization whenever one wants to wake with one. That discovery may well be worthy of a Nobel Prize, but should it be patentable?

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... abated ³

But not, of course, completely resolved.

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... transmissible,⁴

If only by a livery of seisin.

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... goods ⁵

And land.

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... ``rights ⁶

And privileges, liberties, powers, and liberties.

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... secret,⁷

A secret is a striking example of something that lacks all sensible attributes and is purely ideational.

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... unimportant.⁸

I should mention that, when I got roughly to this point in this entry I decided to do a little Googling. It turns out that ``Ideational Property'' is not exactly a new term, although a Lexis search indicates that ii has never been used in legal discourse and has not, as far as I can tell, been proposed, before this, as a substitute for ``Intellectual Property,'' but rather as a subset of ``Intellectual Property'' as traditionally defined. The term seems to be the product of a lexicographer, for the references that I found on Google all seem to come back to the following definition of ``Intellectual Property'' from the on-line edition of the American Heritage Dictionary:

NOUN: A product of the intellect that has commercial value, including copyrighted property such as literary or artistic works, and ideational property, such as patents, appellations of origin, business methods, and industrial processes.

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... entirety.¹

This message is a response to my earlier message to that list in which I said:

[lit-ideas] Re: Is a computer program a performative?

* From: "Peter D. Junger" <junger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
* To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
* Date: Wed, 11 Aug 2004 16:31:32 -0400

I want to thank Teemu Pyyluoma who writes:

This goes to the very heart of a version of mind-body problem that appears with technology "when describing technical artifacts we simultaneously use these two basic conceptualizations technical artifacts are physical objects that are described by physical concepts (the tungsten wire has a length of 15 millimeters) and by intentional concepts such as technical functions (the tungsten wire has the function of emitting light). Moreover, both conceptualizations are indispensable for technical artifacts: if an artifact is described by only physical concepts, it is in general unclear which functions it has, and if an artifact is only described functionally, it is in general unclear which physical properties it has. A description of technical artifacts thus uses both conceptualizations and in that sense technical artifacts have a dual (a physical and an intentional) nature." . . . .

Analogically, the logic of a program is one way to look at it, its function (spspecification, task, application, etc.) is another. The two are somehow related, but how exactly is the problem.

Using pperformative to solve the issue has some promise, that is program x in social context y performs task a, because social context could be defined in such a way that it includes the intentions of designer and user, relevant skills and knowledge of the user, arrangement of work, infrastructure needed and so on. But on the other hand, a concept that broad is not informative at all. And I also have a nagging suspicion that on closer analysis this would turn out to be a tautology.

Personally, I think of using computers as translating from natural language to logical syntax, which is hard precisely because like formal logic it is extremely precise and thus less expressive. As a side note from this follows that at the end there is only one uber-problem in computer science, human-computer interaction. Programs are translating devices, carefully limiting your input and formating output in a form the user is supposed to understand. Like phrase books really. Also, I have no problem communicating using phrases such as "what does this program do?" but "do" in the previous doesn't function the same way as it does in "so what does an executive assistant do anyway?" and ought to be understood as "what can I do with this program?"

I fear that most lawyers, even--or perhaps especially--those who deal with the law relating to computers are remarkably ignorant of the ``dual nature'' of computers and computer programs. I am, therefore, delighted to have the citation to "The Dual Nature of Technical Artifacts."

The particular difficulty that confronts me all the time in my concern that the protection of free speech and of the press be extended to the writings of computer programmers is that many legal scholars and lawyers seem to be firmly convinced that a computer program is a device and therefore that computer programs can be regulated the same way that, for example, machine guns are.

Now to my mind, a "computer program" is either a text containing instructions saying--or descriptions of--what a the computer is supposed to do _or_ it is the function--the process--that is actually performed by the computer.

As a text it seems to me that the computer program should be treated as any other text, although there are many who argue that since it is not directed at communicating something to other human beings it is not entitled to such protections. (That's usually where the claim that a program is a device arises.)

As a process, on the other hand, it seems to me that a computer program should only be regulated in the same way that other processes--like writing or printing or speaking--that produces signs or symbols are regulated.

I hope that there are others on the list who can direct me to discussions that relate to this concern of mine. I have never found anything very helpful in the ordinary legal literature, although I do know of one article that does raise the issue of computer programs as performatives.

Thanks in advance for any further suggestions.

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... 1955.¹

A SAMPLE PAGE FROM THE TABLE OF RANDOM DIGITS


00000   10097 32533  76520 13586  34673 54876  80959 09117  39292 74945
00001   37542 04805  64894 74296  24805 24037  20636 10402  00822 91665
00002   08422 68953  19645 09303  23209 02560  15953 34764  35080 33606
00003   99019 02529  09376 70715  38311 31165  88676 74397  04436 27659
00004   12807 99970  80157 36147  64032 36653  98951 16877  12171 76833

00005   66065 74717  34072 76850  36697 36170  65813 39885  11199 29170
00006   31060 10805  45571 82406  35303 42614  86799 07439  23403 09732
00007   85269 77602  02051 65692  68665 74818  73053 85247  18623 88579
00008   63573 32135  05325 47048  90553 57548  28468 28709  83491 25624
00009   73796 45753  03529 64778  35808 34282  60935 20344  35273 88435

00010   98520 17767  14905 68607  22109 40558  60970 93433  50500 73998
00011   11805 05431  39808 27732  50725 68248  29405 24201  52775 67851
00012   83452 99634  06288 98083  13746 70078  18475 40610  68711 77817
00013   88685 40200  86507 58401  36766 67951  90364 76493  29609 11062
00014   99594 67348  87517 64969  91826 08928  93785 61368  23478 34113

00015   65481 17674  17468 50950  58047 76974  73039 57186  40218 16544
00016   80124 35635  17727 08015  45318 22374  21115 78253  14385 53763
00017   74350 99817  77402 77214  43236 00210  45521 64237  96286 02655
00018   69916 26803  66252 29148  36936 87203  76621 13990  94400 56418
00019   09893 20505  14225 68514  46427 56788  96297 78822  54382 14598

00020   91499 14523  68479 27686  46162 83554  94750 89923  37089 20048
00021   80336 94598  26940 36858  70297 34135  53140 33340  42050 82341
00022   44104 81949  85157 47954  32979 26575  57600 40881  22222 06413
00023   12550 73742  11100 02040  12860 74697  96644 89439  28707 25815
00024   63606 49329  16505 34484  40219 52563  43651 77082  07207 31790

00025   61196 90446  26457 47774  51924 33729  65394 59593  42582 60527
00026   15474 45266  95270 79953  59367 83848  82396 10118  33211 59466
00027   94557 28573  67897 54387  54622 44431  91190 42592  92927 45973
00028   42481 16213  97344 08721  16868 48767  03071 12059  25701 46670
00029   23523 78317  73208 89837  68935 91416  26252 29663  05522 82562

00030   04493 52494  75246 33824  45862 51025  61962 79335  65337 12472
00031   00549 97654  64051 88159  96119 63896  54692 82391  23287 29529
00032   35963 15307  26898 09354  33351 35462  77974 50024  90103 39333
00033   59808 08391  45427 26842  83609 49700  13021 24892  78565 20106
00034   46058 85236  01390 92286  77281 44077  93910 83647  70617 42941

00035   32179 00597  87379 25241  05567 07007  86743 17157  85394 11838
00036   69234 61406  20117 45204  15956 60000  18743 92423  97118 96338
00037   19565 41430  01758 75379  40419 21585  66674 36806  84962 85207
00038   45155 14938  19476 07246  43667 94543  59047 90033  20826 69541
00039   94864 31994  36168 10851  34888 81553  01540 35456  05014 51176

00040   98086 24826  45240 28404  44999 08896  39094 73407  35441 31880
00041   33185 16232  41941 50949  89435 48581  88695 41994  37548 73043
00042   80951 00406  96382 70774  20151 23387  25016 25298  94624 61171
00043   79752 49140  71961 28296  69861 02591  74852 20539  00387 59579
00044   18633 32537  98145 06571  31010 24674  05455 61427  77938 91936

00045   74029 43902  77557 32270  97790 17119  52527 58021  80814 51748
00046   54178 45611  80993 37143  05335 12969  56127 19255  36040 90324
00047   11664 49883  52079 84827  59381 71539  09973 33440  88461 23356
00048   48324 77928  31249 64710  02295 36870  32307 57546  15020 09994
00049   69074 94138  87637 91976  35584 04401  10518 21615  01848 76938

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... information.²

As to what information is, see David S. Touretzky, Basics of Information Theory.

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... messages.³

When the bits that make up the one-time pad are twiddled together with the bits of the message, the contents of the resulting encrypted message are as random as those of the original one-time pad.

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... programs.¹

This is not to say that there are no sensible arguments as to why in certain cases, such as the distribution of computer programs containing executable viruses, the publication of a computer program can be enjoined or criminalized.

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... program ²

Note that the term ``program'' appears once again with what may be still another meaning.

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... readers.¹

The Court also held that even if there were sufficient originality to justify a copyright, the copyright in a collection of unprotected materials is still ``thin'' and not entitled to very much protection.

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... programs ²

Unless they are database programs.

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... result.³

This definition also makes clear that computer programs are intentional entities that exist only if--and to the extent that--they are intended to do something, i.e., intended to bring about a certain result.

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... code).⁴

The Second Circuit also said in that case:

To be frank, the exact contours of copyright protection for non-literal program structure are not completely clear. We trust that as future cases are decided, those limits will become better defined. Indeed, it may well be that the Copyright Act serves as a relatively weak barrier against public access to the theoretical interstices behind a program's source and object codes. This results from the hybrid nature of a computer program, which, while it is literary expression, is also a highly functional, utilitarian component in the larger process of computing.

Generally, we think that copyright registration--with its indiscriminating availability--is not ideally suited to deal with the highly dynamic technology of computer science. Thus far, many of the decisions in this area reflect the courts' attempt to fit the proverbial square peg in a round hole. . . .
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... compilers,⁵

See TheFreeDictionary.com, Optimizing Compiler.

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... compiler.⁶

Of course, this does not in any way imply that there is no protection under the First Amendment for the publication of such compiled code.

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... activities.¹

That may not be a fair and accurate description of Volokh's thought experiment,, but it is an accurate description of the way that I read it and it was my reading that inspired my response to the thought experiment..

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... process.)²

I corrected a typo that appeared in the original reply.

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... Shinshu,¹

The Buddhist Churches of America, to which the Cleveland Buddhist Temple belongs, belong to the Jodo Shinshu school.

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... occasion.²

Buddhism, Marriage and Divorce.

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... homosexual.³

The Buddha taught that we are what we are because of the causes and conditions--and especially the past actions--that brought us to this exact time and place and, though those actions may be considered to be good or bad, there is no basis for judging ourselves, or anyone else, as being good or bad--to say nothing of evil.

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... amendment.⁴

Or, in the case of state laws, the establishment clause of the first amendment as it is ``incorporated'' into the fourteenth amendment as well as, in many states, other clauses of the the state's constitution.

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